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ABSTRACT
The study of the Iranian revolution as a model of Islamic
revolution has failed to explain why a revolution has not
occurred in other Muslim countries.
Egypt, for example, is
undergoing many of the same structural and spiritual crises
that Pahlavi Iran experienced, as well as witnessing a rise in
the power of Islamic revival movements. Although the radical
Islamic
revival
groups
in Egypt
advocate
an
Islamic
revolution, the political, cultural, and religious differences
between Iran and Egypt have kept the current government of
Egypt in place.

v

ISLAMIC REVIVAL MOVEMENTS AND REVOLUTION
THE CASES OF IRAN AND EGYPT

The revolution in Iran has been studied as a paradigm of
Islamic revolution by many political scientists seeking to
understand Islamic revivalist movements in the rest of the
Muslim world.

By studying the Iranian revolution,

hope to predict the next revolution.
theoretical

approaches.

scholars

Scholars take two basic

Structuralists

argue

that

the

revolution occurred because the Pahlavi regime did not respond
with appropriate political
changes

which

rocked

traditional Iranian life.

the

reforms to

social

foundation

and

and economic
structure

of

The cultural or spiritual approach

theorizes that the Islamic revolution found fertile ground in
Iran because modernization became equated with Westernization,
which in turn meant dependency on foreign aid, destruction of
traditional culture, and a moral unraveling of society.

This

cultural breakdown proceeded without providing the benefits of
Westernization as widely seen either on television or in the
excesses

of

the wealthy minority.

The

second model

focuses on spiritual reasons for a revival.

thus

Both approaches

to the study of Islamic revival assume that

it eventually

engenders revolution.
But these

theories

of Islamic

revival

and

revolution

cannot be generalized primarily because they fail to take into
2

consideration
movements,

the

different

types

of

Islamic

revival

the historical differences between Iran and the

rest of the Muslim world, and the different regime responses
toward Islamic revival movements.

This failure stems from the

mistaken assumptions that Islamic revival movements present a
homogeneous

opposition to the

regime,

that the

revivalist

movements are transnational, and that states have not learned
from the example of the Iranian revolution how to respond to
an Islamic challenge.
Scholars, among them David Menashri, Johannes Jansen, and
Werner

Ende,

have

brought

up

the

possibility

revolutions following the Iranian model

of

Islamic

in the rest of the

Muslim world.1 This paper will show that attempts to make the
Iranian revolution the model for all Islamic revolutions have
failed to explain why a revolution has not occurred in Egypt,
for

example,

which

spiritual problems

exhibits
of Pahlavi

most
Iran,

of

the

and

structural

and

also like Pahlavi

Iran, finds itself in the grip of an Islamic revival.

Current Literature on Islamic Revolution

I. Structuralist Models
Scholars

like

Bassam Tibi,

Philip

Khoury,

and Ervand

Abrahamian, among others, root Islamic protest and revolution
in

the

disruptive

effect

economic structures.2

of

modernization

on

social

and

The inability of the state to respond

4
to the disruption is perceived by the people as a crisis of
the state.

The regime loses legitimacy, prompting attempts at

overthrowing it to replace it with an Islamic government.
Bassam Tibi argues that a repoliticization of Islam takes
place in countries where the socio-economic structures have
been so disrupted, and the political systems so deligitimated,
that

"Islamists11 propose a return to the pure

Islam.
rules

ideology of

Their aim is to achieve order in society following the
that

Although

established

these

the

movements

first

suffer

muslim

from

a

city,

lack

of

Medina.
concrete

solutions to the structural problems of society other than the
return

to

Islam,

Tibi

believes

that

they

are

attractive

because they offer meaning "in a situation lacking meaningful
c ause.1,3
Philip Khoury proposes a more comprehensive analysis of
the causes of Islamic

"revivalism"

in the Arab world.

He

delves more deeply into the problem of the crisis of the state
than does Tibi, finding that Islamic revivalists react to the
state's

inability

modernity.

to

bring

the

society

as

a

whole

into

Those most likely to react are those who have been

left behind by the process of modernization: the classes which
have not been assimilated, yet have suffered from being forced
to change what they w e r e /
The inability of the state to bring modernity to all its
people may steifi from regime exhaustion in the face of regional
or international pressures to accept its status as a weaker
entity in a world order dictated by the West.5

The state's

crisis

may

also

be

due

to

elites

coopted

consolidating their power and opening,

by

the

West,

rather than closing,

the gap in wealth between themselves and the lower classes.
The lower classes then react by joining Islamic revivalist
groups.

Khoury also considers the effect of the economic and

political crises of the 1970s, which undermined the legitimacy
of many Arab regimes.
Finally, Khoury points out that Islam becomes the vehicle
for economic and political demands, rather than the impulse.
This

is

a

movement

for

the

correction

of

the

structural

breakdown of society in the guise of a puritanical ideology.
He specifies,
In
sum,
rapid
urbanization
without
dynamic
industrialization,
the increasing inability of the state
to distribute goods and services adequately, the retreat
from pan-Arabism, successive defeats at the hands of
Israel, and mounting external pressures on the state to
liberalize the economic system (liberalization, among
other
things,
contributed
directly
to
escalating
inflation in the 1970s) combined to increase polarization
in Arab society.
One important expression of this
polarization has been Islamic revivalism.6

In other words, the breakdown of traditional society brought
on

by

incomplete

population

and

previously

unequal

modernization

ideologically

polarizes

homogeneous

a
or

unconcerned.
The leaders and adherents of Islamic revivalist movements
come

from the urban

traditional

classes most

stability.

benefited from,

the

They

affected by the

have

suffered,

loss

rather

of

than

state’s attempt at modernizing society

6
from above.

The leaders are most likely to be members of the

urban lower-middle class who live in the old city and maintain
ties with the countryside.

They are relatively well educated,

having attended state schools, but have not found employment
to match their level of education or to meet their financial
needs.

These people would have liked to move out of the old

city and the old system and into the new city but have been
limited by

income,

inflation,

or

lack of

foreign language

skills in an economy increasingly dependent on international
contacts.7
According to Khoury and other scholars, the membership of
Islamic revivalist movements tend to be recent immigrants to
the

city,

usually

living

in

inadequate

peripheral districts of the city.8
the pool of casual labor,

traditions,

culture.

They also

reinforce

and

and

the

are unemployed or underemployed.

feel

from their socio

disoriented

experience alienation,

preserve

in

These people, who make up

They are cut off from their rural roots,
cultural

housing

their

identities

in

the

urban

and attempt to
by

clinging

to

traditional culture and values.9
Both the

leadership

and the rank and file of Islamic

revivalist movements feel alienated by mobilization without
assimilation.

Their lack of opportunities in the modernized

sectors of society and the economy, the relative insecurity
and instability of their daily lives,

contrast starkly with

the flaunted wealth, decadence, and corruption of the modern
elites.

7
Ervand Abrahamian echoes the themes of lower-middle class
alienation,
society.

poor

government

Abrahamian

response,

emphasizes

the

and
role

polarization
of

the

of

economic

crisis of 1975-1977 in bringing down the Pahlavis in Iran.10
A

regime can

survive

an economic

crisis

loyalty of a large segment of society.

if

it claims

the

But in the case of

Iran, society had turned against the Shah during his reign.
Between

1953

and

1977,

Iran

underwent

industrial growth due to its oil revenues.
in part to modernize Iran,
social projects.

tremendous

Revenues were used

through education,

economic and

The state's hold on Iranian society grew

stronger as its bureaucracy expanded.
The modern classes— which Abrahamian separates into the
salaried

middle

class

astonishing rates.

and

the

urban

proletariat— grew

at

The salaried middle class doubled by 1977,

while the urban working class went from making up 5 percent of
the country's labor force in 1953 to 16 percent in 1977.11
But these classes were the first to join the mullahs in
their protests against the regime.
these

classes

became

progressively

Shah's regime beginning in 1953.

Abrahamian contends that
disenchanted

with

the

In that year the coup which

overthrew the popular Prime Minister Muhammad Mossadeq also
obliterated

the

intermediate

groups— labor

unions,

professional associations and independent political parties—
which would have normally linked the lower and middle classes
with the political sector.

This distance between the lower

and middle classes and the government stretched into a gulf,

8
when

it

became

obvious

that

the

government’s -programs

benefited the upper classes far more than the rest of Iranian
society.
Damage to the structure of Iranian society came from the
very

same

learns

programs

of

Education
1963

the

designed to modernize

failures

pointed

out

Iran.

by

Here

Philip

one

Khoury.

and health reform during the White Revolution of

increased

the

number

of

physicians

and

the

rate

of

literacy in Iran, while also reducing infant mortality rates.
However,

after

14

years

of

White

Revolution,

Abrahamian

writes,
68 percent of adults remained illiterate, the number of
illiterates actually rose from 13 million to 15 million,
less than 40 percent of children completed primary
school, only 60,000 university places were available for
as many as 290,000 applicants and the doctor-patient
ratio remained of the worst in the whole of Western
Asia.12
Urban

development

modernization

to

programs

city-dwellers

brought
as

the

peripheral

multiplied and pollution increased.

same

unequal

shanty-towns

Tehran did not have a

modern sewage system or adequate public transportation to cut
through the city's terrible traffic jams.
Meanwhile, the countryside suffered from the failure of
agricultural reforms.

Land ownership remained essentially in

the hands of old aristocracy and absentee landlords, with 1
million landholders owning fewer than 3 hectares each, while
700 000 peasants remained landless.13
Thus

urban

and

rural

problems

in

Iran

depicted

by

Abrahamian closely parallel the inequities reported by Khoury.

But

Abrahamian

goes

one

step

further.

The

population,

dissatisfied with the economic situation— and disgusted with
the conspicuously wealthy minority— had no political arena in
which

to

air

its

views.

The

Shah,

while

attempting

to

modernize the economy, had consolidated his political power by
eradicating all organs of political participation other than
the Rastakhiz party.14

By doing so,

he lost his political

base of support and severed ties with the traditional middle
class, which had long supported the monarchy.
The traditional middle class, composed mainly of bazaar
merchants— who controlled nearly two thirds of the country's
retail trade— became alienated from the monarchy when it too
lost its guilds and professional organizations in the wake of
the formation of the Rastakhiz party.

The bazaaris, merchants

who were also money-lenders, wielded considerable influence
over their employees, associates, brokers, and the countryside
where they owned commercial farms and manufacturing plants.15
But more
financial,

importantly,

and

establishment.

the bazaaris maintained social,

ideological
This

links

with

the

religious

link proved to be the most dangerous

association of all for the government to test by abolishing
traditional guilds in favor of state-sponsored and supervised
organizations.
professional

Not

content with destroying the bazaaris'

organizations,

state officials also talked of

bulldozing the bazaars entirely to make way for a state-run
market.16
During the inflationary period between 1975 and 1977, the
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Shah blamed the economic crisis on the bazaars,

while also

waging a war of control against the religious establishment.
He attempted to wrest spiritual leadership of the nation from
the until-then quiescent religious hierarchy by announcing the
advent of a great new civilization, encouraging Parliament to
disregard the religious

laws,

and establishing a Religious

Corps to nationalize religion.17
Protests by the religious establishment elicited a harsh
regime crackdown,
imprisoned.

during which many prominent clerics were

Benefiting from the population’s animosity toward

the regime and its disenchantment with the economic situation,
the mullahs also argued that modernization and urbanization
had brought moral laxity to Iranian society.
traditional

values

and

religious

laws

as

They advocated
the

antidote

to

crime, alcoholism, prostitution, delinquency, and other social
ills.

The tiny anti-regime religious opposition expanded to

include the previously accommodating clerics who found that
the regime would not hear their grievances.
The combination of the traditional middle classes,
disenchanted

modern

middle

and

lower

classes,

and

the
the

religious opposition proved too much for the regime to put
down.

Thus the Shah lost his monarchy because he did not

provide political outlets for his people, who then turned to
the religious establishment.
Jerrold Green provides,
most

comprehensive

analysis

among the structuralists,
of

the

Iranian

the

revolution.

According to Green, the breakdown of the monarchy stemmed from
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its weakening capacity to coerce its opposition, combined with
the mobilization of previously non-political sectors of the
population under the leadership of the religious elite.18
His

model

describes

the

six

conditions

leading

to

countermobilization:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
The

The declining coercive will or capacity of the state.
A simplification of politics.
Mass polarization.
The politicization of traditionally non-political
social sectors.
Crisis-initiating event(s).
Exacerbating responses by the regime.19

state

according

exhibited
to

its

Green,

consistently

to

Specifically,

internal

declining

through

pressures

coercive

its

from

political

will

inability
within

activity

in
to

and
in

Iran,
react

without.

the

form

of

manifestos and open letters from the secular opposition, and
religious demonstrations and marches by the mobilized urban
classes triggered a cycle of tolerance and violent repression
from the Shah.

Early in Iran's revolution, the Shah was under

international pressure to liberalize his regime.

The Carter

administration in particular sent frequent messages to the
Shah regarding the deplorable human rights situation in Iran.
This

is why,

according to Green,

the Shah did not respond

violently at first to the nascent protest.
The

short

experiment

with

liberalization,

called

the

"Tehran Spring" by some, was followed by numerous instances of
military repression of processions and demonstrations in Qum,
Tabriz,

and

Tehran.20

But,

Green

argues,

the

Shah

was

resppnding to the symptoms rather than to the malady itself,.
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by

using

manner.

intermittent

force

in

a

limited

and

inefficient

He alienated the majority of the population without

striking at the leaders of the revolution.
When the regime struck at the revolutionary leaders, it
did so in an inefficient and even inflammatory way.
daily

newspaper,

an

organ

of

the

government,

A Tehran

published

a

letter attacking Ayatollah Khomeini, defaming his character,
and blaming him for the deaths of demonstrators.

This letter

provoked spontaneous riots and demonstrations in Tehran and
Qum, by people who could not countenance the personal attack
on the

respected

and charismatic religious leader.21

Far

from discrediting the Ayatollah Khomeini, the letter provided
him with a ready-made base of support and vaulted him into the
leadership of the unfocused opposition.
This attack on Khomeini characterizes the role of the
government

in

politics.

polarizing

the

population

and

simplifying

The population saw two opposite poles,

political choices in the middle.

with few

Given its experience with

the government and the ever-clearer message from the religious
opposition that the choice lay between the forces of light and
those

of

darkness,

opposition.
lot

with

the

the

population

chose

the

religious

Secular opponents of the regime threw in their
religious

establishment,

realizing

that

the

strength of the popular support the clerics could marshall far
outweighed their own base of support.22
Although

the

middle

classes

had

been

previously

politicized through political participation and education, the

13
majority

of

the

Iranian

population

did

not

exhibit

much

political awareness before the revolution gained momentum.
Under

the

direction

urbanized peasants

of

the

mullahs,

participated

millions

in peaceful

of

newly

demonstrations

against the Shah's regime.23
Before full countermobilization can be reached, one more
condition must be met.
and

exacerbating

Green sees crisis-initiating events

regime

responses

as

transition from reformism to revolution.

essential

in

the

The Khomeini letter

provoked demonstrations, which led to government repression,
more gatherings,

and martyrs

for the cause.

A

fire at a

movie-theater which killed 4 00 people was blamed on the reform
movement

by

the

government.

In

response,

the

religious

opposition investigated the fire and found evidence of secret
police

involvement.

violently put

On

down riots

September

8,

1978

the

military

in Tehran,

prompting Khomeini to

announce that Muslims would not kill Muslims and thus the
government must have employed Israeli troops to shoot at the
rioters.24
Many

This was followed by martial law in many cities.
other

incidents

and

regime

intensify the climate of revolution.
stop the religious opposition,
bureaucracy,

lowered

women's affairs.
followers

of

taxes,

responses

served

to

When violence could not

the Shah offered jobs in the

and

dismissed

the minister of

Yet just as the violence had incensed the

the

religious

opposition,

the

financial

inducements disgusted them, additional proof that the regime
had lost all legitimacy and had to resort to bribery.25
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Green also lists the reasons why the opposition .garnered
so much support in such little time.

The religious opposition

cast itself as an anti-Shah movement, rather than approaching
potential adherents with a program or a positive message.

The

vague message appealed to all Iranians who were embittered by
the

regime.

This

socioeconomic,

led

to

a

educational,

glossing
religious,

over

of

and

ethnic,
regional

differences because of the common hatred of the Shah.

The

countermobilization in Iran included Iranians working for the
government, as well as many lower level bureaucrats who simply
moved over to the opposition.

Finally, because the revolution

had no real oppositional center, the regime could not crush
it.

Its personal attacks against Khomeini simply increased

popular support for the cleric.26
After the revolution, according to Green, Iranian society
demobilized.
resurfaced.

Structural differences which had been ignored
Ethnic and religious minorities reverted to their

traditional rivalry for resources while attempting to maintain
their autonomy.27
which

permitted

In essence, the simplification of politics
countermobilization

dissipated

after

the

revolution.

II. Models of Spiritual and Cultural Crisis
John Esposito and Alan Taylor put forward the alternative
theory

that

the

Iranian

revolution

and

Islamic

protest

movements in general have their roots in reaction to the moral
failure of the secular state.28

15
John Esposito qualifies his analysis of the resurgence of
Islam with the admonition that the causes are many and should
be "appreciated within the contexts of individual countries
and

regions."29

Nevertheless,

pervade the Muslim experience.

he

lists

some

causes

that

Contemporary Muslims suffer

from an identity crisis stemming from a sense of failure— in
the context of the Arab loss in the Six Day War and of the
secular-nationalist experiment— and lack of self-esteem.

They

are disillusioned with the West and the failure of the western
systems of government in muslim nations.

They also find pride

in the military success of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, the
oil

embargo

of

the

same

year

which

economies, and the Iranian revolution.

deeply

hurt

western

Finally, contemporary

Muslims are searching for an identity beyond emulation of the
West.

They yearn for the authenticity and simplicity of their

Islamic past.
These feelings transcend socio-economic barriers.
1967 war

is

remembered

as

"the disaster,"

The

a defeat which

seemed to many to indicate that God was no longer with His
community.30

Religious

leaders argued that it was not God

who had abandoned Muslims, but rather Muslims who had strayed
from the straight path.

Revivalism answered the questions

also of westernized intellectuals and elites who could not
understand

the

failure

societies' needs.
western

elite

development.

of

modernization

to

meet

their

Both traditional religious leaders and the

decried

the

failure

of

western

models

of

It did not help that governments with pseudo-

16
democratic

facades

really maintained

authoritarian- control

over Muslim societies.
While the 197 3 war against Israel was no victory,
demonstrated the strength of the Egyptian army.

it

Furthermore,

the use of Islamic symbolism in the war led to its remembrance
as

a

religious

war.

The

oil

embargo

by

the

petroleum

producing states showed that Muslim states were a force to be
reckoned with.
Emirates

Saudi Arabia,

supported

Islamic

Libya,

organizations

projects throughout the Muslim world.
revolution

in

1978-79

and the United Arab

seemed

to

prove

and

development

Finally, the Iranian
that

Muslims

could

mobilize to restore Islam to the state and live free from
dependency on the West.

Islamic movements in Sunni and Shii

countries alike believed that the Iranian revolution was a
harbinger and a model for the Muslim world.31
In another work,

Esposito explains how the revivalist

movements have progressed toward political activism to bring
about their Islamic state.

Increasingly alienated from the

state, which may use violence to suppress them or religious
imagery
against
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

to coopt

them, militants

the secular state

justify

their

struggle

with several basic claims:

Muslim's [sic] have a God-ordained purpose and
vocation, that is, submission to and realization of
God's will, which governs both individual and
community life.
The correct path for society or Shariah is contained
in the Quran and Sunnah.
Islam is a total way of life that embraces religion
and politics, state and society.
An Islamic state
must be established.
It is imperative
thatthe Shariah be implemented,
replacing existing Western-inspired legal codes.

17
6.

7.
8.

9.
10.
11.
12.

13.

There

The westernization of Muslim society and its-Western
models for modernization are condemned because they
have failed and are thus responsible for political
corruption, economic decline, social injustice, and
spiritual malaise, just like the pre-Islamic period
of ignorance.
A Western Judeo-Christian conspiracy pits the West
against the East.
Governments such as Egyptfs that do not follow the
Shariah are illegitimate.
Those guilty of
unbelief, "atheist states," are lawful objects of
j ihad.
Muslims are obliged both to overthrow such
governments and to fight those Muslims who do not
share the "total commitment" of militants.
Jihad against unbelievers is a religious duty.
Non-Muslims are no longer considered "People of the
Book" but rather unbelievers.
Thus non-Muslim
minorities, such as the Copts, are persecuted.
The official ulama are rejected for their tendency
to downplay the meaning of jihad as armed struggle.
They have succumbed to the West and have been co
opted by the government.
The majority of mosques that are state supported and
controlled are places of unbelief because God’s will
and the Prophet’s teachings are not upheld there.32

is very little mention of any structural reason for

opposing

the

state.

Rather,

the

focus

is

on

the

moral

imperative of returning to true Islam and the spiritual peace
ensuing from this return.
While Alan Taylor mentions

some structural grievances

held by the revolutionaries in Iran, his analysis focuses on
the anti-Western aspect of the Islamic opposition.
was the Shah pro-West,
Islamic

culture

of

Not only

but he attempted to deemphasize the

Iran

in

favor

of

reinforcing

national

identity and even the pre- Islamic character of the monarchy
at his 1971 celebration at Persepolis ,33
the traditional

masses

espouse the

Thus not only did

cause of the religious

opposition, but the westernized elites, in rejecting the Shah,
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reidentified with Islam.34
Shah

of

disliking

Ayatollah Khomeini accused the

traditional

Iranian

culture,

of

collaborating with the United States at the expense of Iran,
of corruption,

and of exploiting the Iranian people.

These

are all moral offenses.35

III. Revivalism as a Response to Structural and Spiritual
Malaise
A few scholars have sought to reconcile the structural
and

cultural

comprehensive

or

spiritual

approach

protest movements.

to

arguments
explaining

Alan Taylor

to
the

provide

a

rise

Islamic

is among them,

of
as

more

is Ami

Ay a Ion.36
Alan

Taylor

emphasizes

that

the

corruption

and

dissolution of the Pahlavi regime made the structural problems
in Iran seem like insults to the people.

The traditional

balance between the government and the religious institutions
had been upset by the Shah.

He was attempting to change the

basic structure of society, and at the same time altered the
political structure of Iran.
modernization
most,

Moreover, the Shah had promised

for all and had not met the expectations of

while upsetting their traditional way of life.

The

Iranians were disillusioned and unhappy with westernization,
not only because they yearned for Islam and tradition,

but

because it had altered their lives in a negative manner.
Ami Ayalon puts forward a more convincing combination of
structural and spiritual/cultural reasons leading to the rise
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of Islamic revivalist movements,

specifically in Egypt.

He

argues that it is precisely because the crisis is two-fold,
material and spiritual, that the Islamic challenge may prove
dangerous for the Egyptian regime.37
According to Ayalon, Egypt's socioeconomic crisis stems
from the paucity of arable land and the rapid expansion of the
population.

Combined with an inefficient and insufficient

economic structure which makes Egypt dependent on foreign aid,
notably

from the United

States,

the crisis creates a huge

foreign debt and an economy of need, rather than of supply and
demand.

A general sense of socioeconomic malaise results from

periodic shortages of food, scarcity of housing, unemployment,
poor public services, and the large gap between the minority
of wealthy Egyptians and the majority of the population.

The

government is entangled in subsidies, which the United States
and organizations supplying aid to Egypt have pressured Hosni
Mubarak to eliminate.
The hidden

economy

and regional

interest

in Egyptian

stability contribute to the continuity of the regime, as did
the elimination by the United States and many allies of large
portions of the Egyptian debt in exchange for support during
the

Gulf

remains,

War.
as

does

Nevertheless,
the

the

feeling

spiritual-ideological

of

dependency

dilemma,

Ayalon describes as a "crisis of disorientation."

which

Why hasn't

Egypt carved a more important niche in the world after several
decades of independence?

The failure of pan-Arabism and the

obvious corruption of the ideals of socioeconomic justice have
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led many

to

concepts.

the validity

One of their options,

according
believes

question

to

Ayalon,

that

the

is

by

Islamic

Islamic

of

secular

nationalist

far the most

revivalism.

revivalist

But

movement

"is

popular
Ayalon
not

a

socioeconomic protest movement which happens to phrase its
complaint

in Islamic

movement which

terms...

Rather,

it

is gaining ground due to

is a

religious

socioeconomic and

spiritual circumstances."38

Pahlavi Iran and Contemporary Egypt;
Similar Problems. Different Circumstances

In many ways, the debate between the structuralists and
spiritualists boils down to the question about the chicken and
the

egg.

Which

came

first,

structural

yearning for a spiritual renewal?

dislocation,

or

But the point on which they

agree is that the presence of Islamic revivalist movements in
states suffering from attendant structural problems can be
problematic for the stability of the state.
This quickly-drawn conclusion suffers from the attention
of scholars to the structural and spiritual causes of Islamic
revivalism

rather

than

on

the

effects

movements on politics in the state.
of Islamic revival movements,

of

the

revivalist

By studying the effects

one might be able to trace a

pattern of alienation leading to anti-regime violence
particular state.

in a

But because the only contemporary Islamic

revolution occurred in Iran, many scholars study the Iranian
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revolution in order to predict the next revolution in the
Muslim world.
In

the

Ayatollah

euphoria

Khomeini

following

declared

the

that

revolution

the

Islamic, not just a Shii, revolution.39

in

revolution

Iran,
was

an

Despite the initial

admiration for the Iranian revolution and its leader in parts
of the Muslim world, no other country has followed suit with
an Islamic revolution of its own.

Most notably, Egypt, with

a past so similar to Iran's and a large network of established
Islamic protest movements,

maintains a secular nationalist

government.

I. Iran and Egypt; Patterns of Similarity
The most striking similarities between pre-revolutionary
Iran and Egypt lie both in the structure of their society and
in the rejection of westernization in favor of the puritanical
and nativistic values

of Islam.

Christopher

model

Clapham's

Both Egypt and

of the

Iran

neo-patrimonial

fit

state.

Clapham has defined a neo-patrimonial state as one in which
rational-legal structures inherited from the former colonial
power are laid on top of a grid of relationships from the
traditional

patrimonial

relationships,

of

which

integral components,
the

state

towards

system.40

The

pattern

of

corruption

and

patronage

feudal
are

two

affects the behavior of bureaucrats in
each

other

and

towards

those

outside

government.41
Public positions become platforms for the accumulation of
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personal power.
on

the

The behavior of people in public office takes

quality

of

displaying

this

status

rather

than

performing the duties associated with the position.

This

results in a government bureaucracy riddled with inefficiency.
Neo-patrimonial
corruption,

states

are

also

characterized

by

which emerges as a result of 11the weakness of

accountability by the governors to the governed."42

The lack

of

distance

accountability

between

can

the western

be

related

educated

to

elite

the

social

in government

and the

masses, and the institutionalized inequalities of power within
the hierarchical structure of the state.
regime

is also

patrons.

So

characteristics

Often,

externally buttressed by
far,

one

can

relate

of the neo-patrimonial

its

the

a corrupt

international

above-mentioned

state

to both pre

revolutionary Iran and Egypt, following the evidence presented
by Abrahamian, Green, Khoury, and Esposito.
Clapham differentiates between two types of corruption,
parochial

and extractive.

Parochial

corruption,

the

less

disruptive of the two to society, involves the redistribution
of resources and benefits within the community.
corruption

exists

on

a

larger

scale,

Extractive

"rests

on

the

manipulation of state power, and maintains the lifestyle of a
privileged

class

of

state

corruption

erodes

public

employees."43

trust

in

Extractive

authorities,

contributing to a lack of shared sense of values.

while

Thus when

the community is no longer receiving adequate resources and
benefits from its patron, it becomes distrustful of the state
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and alienated from it.
Patron-client relationships are established by those in
power to maintain power.

The patron provides physical or

legal protection, employment, property, economic development,
even

religious

intercession.

The

client

responds

military service, voting, labor, and information.

with

A society

characterized by patron-client relations, whether between the
state

and

the

institutions,

people

within

the

hierarchy

of

state

is a society deeply divided between superiors

and inferiors, but also within classes.44
Patron-client organization of a society,
Clapham,

according to

most characterizes the Third World states where a

competitive party system has emerged since independence.

In

such a society, the party leadership is obligated as a patron
to look out for the interests of its constituent group.

It

comes to be regarded as the legitimate leadership of that
group,

regardless

wealth.

of

the

obvious

difference

in

class

and

Thus the patron-client relationship maintains the

patron class in power while also minimizing the issue of class
in political conflicts.
Although pre-revolutionary Iran did not function along
the lines of a pluralistic political system in a formal sense,
it had experimented with multi-party politics in the 1950's
through
trade
voices

the

nationalist

organizations
to

hierarchy.

be

and communist parties.

provided

heard,

as

did

opportunities
the

for

Moreover,
citizens'

state-subsidized

Shii

However, the cooptation of westernized elites by
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the

Shah,

his

consolidation

of

political

power,

and

his

crackdown on both the bazaar organizations and the religious
establishment

denied

Iranians

any

effective

means

of

opposition.
Patron-client

relationships

are

based

on

inherent

inequalities between the partners, and their benefits to the
partners are uneven.

Furthermore, patron-client relationships

exacerbate the problems already present in Third World states,
namely corruption, the inefficient allocation of resources,
ethnic and religious conflicts,
the state.

A participant

and the unaccountability of

in a patron-client relationship

looks to the system and the state for the satisfaction of a
private benefit rather than a public need.45

When,

in the

case of pre-revolutionary Iran or contemporary Egypt, it seems
that the state no longer satisfies the private benefits of
most citizens,

it becomes a public crisis.

If someone can

organize, politicize, and mobilize the dissatisfied citizens,
the crisis becomes generalized to a crisis of the state.
Most

importantly,

a

neo-patrimonial

state

in

which

corruption and patron-client relations are the norm cannot
claim the legitimacy that a modern rational-legal state can.
If the vulnerability of the client decreases, the client may
remove himself or herself from the relationship and look for
more

objectively

pursue interests.

efficient

institutions

through

which

to

The more likely scenario in the case of

neo-patrimonial countries, argues Clapham, is that despairing
clients may follow "some new and revolutionary path,

which
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will

also be

based on universalistic"

values.46

.It seems

that in the case of Egypt and pre-revolutionary Iran, the new
and revolutionary path is not radical communism but Islam.
Egypt

and

pre-revolutionary

Iran

description of a neo-patrimonial state.

equally

fit

the

One can argue that in

pre-revolutionary Iran, neo-patrimonialism came to be rejected
for

a

failure

number
of

of

the

reasons

regime

and

dislocation of traditions.

stemming

from

the malaise

the

socioeconomic

brought

on

by

the

In its place, Islamic revivalists

sought to institute a state which would meet the needs of the
people without promoting the inequalities that a patron-client
relationship does.
The rational-legal structures which the Pahlavis adopted
after their accession to power were discarded in favor of
Islamic

law,

the

Sharia.

The monarchy

and

its

extensive

bureaucracy were replaced by a theocracy, headed by an Imam,
whose authority derived legitimacy from the hierarchy of Shii
Islam and the myth of the seventh Imam.

The secular state,

which had failed to meet the employment, educational, health
and

religious

which opposed

needs
it,

of

individuals,

while

attacking

those

was replaced by the Islamic state which

purported to bring the Umma back and the golden age of Islam
with it.47
Whether or not the Iranian revolution has met these goals
does not concern us.

However,

it seems clear that Iranians

revolted against a system which denied them socio-economic
security, and political participation, while robbing them of
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their

traditional

religion

and

culture.

Increasingly

nepotistic and corrupt, the Shah's regime was no longer able
or willing, as a patron, to provide for its client classes.
By alienating prosperous clients like the bazaaris, the Shah
freed them from their obligations to the state.

They then

looked to the clerics to fulfill the needs that the state had
not.
In Egypt, Hosni Mubarak's presidency, like Anwar Sadat's
before him, has been accused of corruption and nepotism.

This

is ironic considering Mubarak's pledge to clean up Egyptian
politics upon his accession to the presidency.
population growth and the

lack of

university-educated Egyptians

employment

exacerbates

Moreover,

available to

the pressures

on

Mubarak to meet their socio-economic needs.
While Mubarak has made some efforts toward providing a
more pluralistic forum for expression, a generation has grown
up having had access to university education in rural areas
yet not finding employment in Cairo.

The newly urbanized,

educated youth provide fertile recruiting pools for the Muslim
Brotherhood

(Ikhwan

organizations
(Munazzamat
(Jamaat

like

al-Muslimin)
the

al-Tahrir

Islamic

other,

al-Jihad).48

and

the
Mamoun

more

Liberation

al-Islami), the

al-Muslimin),

(Munazzamat

and

Holy

Society
War

Fandy

militant

Organization
of

Muslims

Organization
describes

the

patronage system in Egypt as a system which favors the Cairene
over the rural Egyptian.

He writes,

This network begins at the highest level of the Egyptian

27
government.
It is widely known in Egypt that the
government is controlled by Mubarakfs in-laws. Thus the
Islamists [sic] emphasis on brotherhood is a mirror image
of the family-centered Egyptian power elite.49
Following Anwar Sadat*s assassination in 1981 by members
of

the

Holy War Organization,

or

al-Jihad,

Hosni

Mubarak

attempted to improve the government's relations with Islamic
organizations.

He lifted the ban on the Muslim Brotherhood's

participation

in

permitted

form

to

politics,
their

though
own

they

party.

were
He

still

freed

not

Muslim

Brotherhood leaders and other moderate Islamic revivalists.50
In

1984,

the Muslim Brotherhood

nationalist,

allied with

the

Wafd,

or

party to contest the parliamentary elections.

The alliance won 12 seats in the People's Assembly.51
In the election of 1987, the Muslim Brotherhood allied
itself with two secular parties, the Socialist Labor Party and
the Liberal Party.

Under the banner of an "Islamic alliance,"

they

more

obtained

20

People's Assembly.52

seats

for

the

Brotherhood

Following the declaration by

in

the

Egypt's

High Constitutional Court that the electoral law under which
the People's Assembly had been elected was unconstitutional,
Mubarak dissolved the People's Assembly.53

The

subsequent

elections were boycotted by almost all the opposition parties,
including the Muslim Brotherhood.
Mubarak's

manipulation

of

the

Higher

Constitutional

Court, his creation of new electoral laws to keep political
opposition

out

of

the

People's

Assembly,

his

reversal

of

policy on the Islamicist issue, the imprisonment and torture
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of

several

militant

Islamicists,

and

the

ruling

National

Democratic Party's control over the patronage system all hark
back to Clapham's neo-patrimonial system.
Similarly,

the

Shah

throughout his reign.

manipulated

politics

in

Iran

In 1953, he allied with the CIA to

overthrow then prime minister Muhammad Mosaddeq, a nationalist
who undermined the Shah by advocating the nationalization of
the

Iranian

oil

industry.54

The

Shah

then

set

about

destroying all opposition to the monarchy with the support of
the United States and the CIA trained SAVAK.

They began with

the Tudeh party, the communist party of Iran, which sustained
such

a

severe

blow

from

repeated

arrests,

torture,

executions, and cooptation that by the mid 1950's, it barely
maintained an underground.

The National Front, the party of

Muhammad Mosaddeq, though not persecuted quite as forcefully,
suffered consistent harassment and monitoring, which created
a much

quieter,

more

careful

opposition.

The

religious

right's leading ayatollahs were also pressured into supporting
the regime.55
Experimenting with a state-controlled two party system
throughout the 1950's, the Shah dissolved parliament in 1961,
reinstating it with handpicked appointees soon afterward.
pattern

of

control

over

the

political

participation

His
of

Iranians continued into the 1970's, when human rights abuses
became so obvious that even prime minister Hoveyda and the
Shah had to admit that torture occurred in Iranian prisons.
The government's security forces were especially thorough in
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their assault

on the religious

establishment.

James

Bill

writes,
In their crushing attack on Shi*ism,
the shah's
government closed down the publishing houses that
produced books on religion and social problems.
SAVAK
infiltrated mosque meetings and prayer sessions and
disbanded religious student organizations on campuses
throughout Iran. The government arrested, interrogated,
imprisoned, tortured, and even executed large numbers of
clerics.56
The elimination of any avenue of political expression—
and opposition— culminated in the formation of the Rastakhiz
party in 1977.

The Shah ordered all Iranians to join the

party, intending to abolish all other intermediary groups like
student unions, bazaar trade guilds and religious societies.
When it became obvious, in 1978, that the single party was all
that

the

Shah

was

offering

Iranians

in

the

way

of

participatory mechanisms, Iranians drew their battle lines.
Like
structural

pre-revolutionary

Iran,

problems

economy

in

its

Egypt
and

suffers
society.

from
The

historical origins of these problems can be found in the first
revolution which nominally restored independence to Egypt from
Great Britain in 1922.

Under Gamal Abdal Nasser,

it seemed

that Egypt was destined to become one of the most important
players in regional politics.

Secular nationalist ideology

promised the benefits of modernization without dependency on
the West.
However, the promises of military greatness and economic
independence grew stale when unemployment,

urban crowding,

uneven income distribution, nepotism, corruption, and defeat
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at the hands of Israel came about in the late 196Q's.

At

present, Egypt must import 50 to 70 percent of its food and
inflation makes it very difficult for the poor to keep up.57
But the poor are not the only ones disillusioned with the
unfulfilled promises,

and the population continues to grow

beyond the resources of the state.
Meanwhile, political participation is limited.

While far

less authoritarian than the Shah, Mubarak maintains control
over

the

political

structures

presidents before him,

Mubarak,

in

Egypt.

Like

all

the

as a former member of the

armed forces, can count on their support in quelling unrest.
In exchange, the president perpetuates the special position
and privileges

of the military,

mindful

of their

role

in

overthrowing previous Egyptian rulers.
The cabinet is firmly under the p r e s i d e n t s control.

Its

primary function is to implement policy through the large and
unwieldy

civil

bureaucracy

which

controls

most

of

the

country's daily affairs.
The regime also retains control over the legislature, in
both the People's Assembly and the Consultative Council.

The

People's Assembly is the state's chief legislative body, also
designated
between

the

in

the

constitution

government

and

the

as

a

forum

opposition.

unlike those of the Consultative Council,

for discussion
Its

members,

are all elected.

But because the governing National Democratic Party holds a
large majority of the seats,

the parliament in Egypt often

simply sanctions government policy.58
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The

judiciary

respected

is

institution

perhaps

the

in Egypt.

most

Unlike

independent

and

his predecessors,

Mubarak has complied with the court's decisions.

His greater

fault may be in complying too quickly, as in the instance when
the

election

laws

were

declared

unconstitutional,

which

permitted Mubarak simply to dissolve parliament and call new
elections.
Mubarak has expanded the multi-party system first allowed
by Anwar Sadat.

Parties are

parliamentary elections,
The

National

Democratic

free to organize,

compete in

even publish their own newspapers.
Party,

the

now

defunct Arab Socialist Union, represents the government.

Its

chairman is Hosni Mubarak.
by

ministers

and

state

administer elections.

the

successor

of

Its other important posts are held
officials.

State

officials

also

In a nation where the state has always

been identified with the president in power, it is difficult
to vote against the president's party.
offer

its

citizens

participation

than

more

official

Thus while Egypt may
political

pre-revolutionary

Iran,

it

organs
does

of
not

guarantee that in the final analysis, the opposition will be
given as much regard as the government's party.
Moreover, Egypt is experiencing much the same spiritual
crisis as did pre-revolutionary Iran.

Like the Iranians who

decried the moral decay of society due to the westernization
of the elite's and the regime's values,

Egyptians have lost

their shared sense of values with their leadership.59

This

particular component of Clapham's model of the neo-patrimonial
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state rings true for both Iran and Egypt, through the obvious
abandonment
Egypt*s

of

secular

educated

nationalism by

youth

in

favor

a

of

large

Islamic

segment

of

revivalist

movements.60
Not

only

have

disillusioned

and

marginalized

newly

urbanized university students and graduates joined the Islamic
movement,
members

but
of

many

the

professionals,

military

revivalist movements.

have

bureaucrats,

become

members

and
of

even

Islamic

It is in the movements themselves that

the greatest differences between the Iranian and the Egyptian
Islamic opposition can be seen.

II. Islamic Revival Movements: the Core and the Factions
Puritanical Muslim opposition to a state perceived as
overly secular or atheistic finds its roots in the literature
documenting the overthrow of the Umayyad caliphate in the mid
eighth century by the Abbasids.
thought

emerged

on

the

Two competing schools of

legality

of

revolt.

The

group

supporting the ousted Umayyads, sometimes called the Nabita,
or young upstarts, claimed that any disobedience to the legal
ruler is wrong.

The duty of the Muslim is to obey the Caliph

in order to avoid fitna. or chaos.
approach to politics
second

school

of

in Islam,

thought,

philosopher al-Jahiz,

This has been the orthodox
both

Sunni

represented

by

and Shii.

The

the

and

writer

maintains that it is the duty of the

Muslim to resist and depose an impious ruler, when that ruler
is

"neglecting

his

duties

and

abusing

his

powers

as

a
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sovereign .1
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The basis for this interpretation of the political duties
of the Muslim, used by all of the Islamic revival groups to
justify their political opposition to the state, can be found
in two of the Prophet Muhammad*s sayings, or hadith:

"There

is no [duty of] obedience in sin," and "Do not obey a creature
against his Creator."

These two sayings seem to signal the

Prophet*s permission to disobey the Imam,
Islamic

community-state,

in

the

instance

the head of the
where

the

Imam

demands something from his subjects which is contrary to God's
law.
Nevertheless,

the orthodox interpretation of these two

sayings has been that disobedience should happen only in the
most extreme cases.

In all other cases, in fact in most other

cases, obedience and quietism are urged in the name of order
and the preservation of the Umma.

The message of quietism was

accepted far more extensively in the Muslim world than was
that of duty of disobedience.

The recurring theme has been

instead the duty to avoid fitna, the "disruption of religious,
social and political order leading to chaos."62
This debate was therefore short-lived and limited for the
most part

to the

Sunni

tradition.

Nevertheless,

in this

debate lie the roots and the justification used by both the
Shii

opposition

in

Iran

and

the various

groups in Egypt and other countries.

Sunni

opposition

In order to understand

the arguments of the Islamic revival groups, it is necessary
to explore in more depth the differences between the Sunni and
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Shii branches of Islam.
A. Iran: the Shii Establishment
The

greatest

schism

in

Islam's

history

political differences between the partisans
prophet's cousin and son-in-law —

based

of Ali

—

on
the

as a successor to Muhammad,

and those who followed the elected caliphs.
Ali,

was

The partisans of

or Shiat A l i . believed that he was a more legitimate

successor to Muhammad than the caliphs on the basis of his
blood relationship to the prophet, but also on the basis of
his personal piety.

The descendants of Ali came to be the

political opponents of Muawiya,

the founder of the Umayyad

Caliphate.63
Also important in popular Shii history is the story of
Ali's two sons, Huseyn and Hassan.
Umayyad

dynasty,

allegedly

become the next caliph.

Muawiya,

promised

Hassan

founder of the
that

he

Instead, he had him poisoned.

would
Huseyn

survived his brother, fighting the caliphate until Yazid, the
son of Muawiya, killed him at Karbala.

Karbala is now one of

the pilgrimage sites of Shii Islam.
Although
mourning

for

intercession

the popular practice of Shii
Huseyn's
during

the

Islam

martyrdom

and

month

Muharram,

of

asking
he

includes
for

his

has

not

traditionally been a figure who incites people to revolution.
As a matter of fact,

Shii Islam has made a doctrine out of

quietism and acceptance of the de facto separation of politics
and religion.

However,

in his rhetoric against the Shah,

Ayatollah Khomeini frequently cast himself as Huseyn and the
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Shah as Yazid.64
Shii Islam is divided into several conflicting factions.
The form of Shii Islam which most Iranians follow is 1Twelver
Shiism', a doctrine which traces the line of Imams from Ali
down to his twelfth descendant.

The twelfth Imam remains

hidden, to return one day as the messiah, or m a hdi. to bring
the world into the age of true Islam.65
the twelfth
followers.

The hidden nature of

Imam does not mean that he has

abandoned his

Rather, he is communicating his spiritual guidance

to them through learned men— ulama in Arabic,

ayatollah or

muitahid in farsi— who authorize their followers to obey the
government even if it is not legitimate.

The doctrine of the

hidden

set

Imam

implies

that

all

will

be

right

when

he

returns.66
Twelver Shiis believe that they must obey the decrees of
particular ayatollahs until the hidden Imam returns.

They

also believe that one particular mujtahid should claim the
allegiance of all other mujtahids.

This source of imitation

emerges by consensus from other mujtahids by virtue of his
great piety and writings.
any given time.

There is supposed to be only one at

Ayatollah Khomeini emerged as the source of

imitation during the late 1970's, when the usually quietist
Shii establishment and citizenry followed him to revolution.
The

mujtahids

charismatic leaders.

or

ayatollahs

are

also

venerated

as

This veneration derives especially from

the popular conception of ayatollahs as "sacred deputies of a
supernatural being," the hidden Imam.

Ayatollah Khomeini's
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charisma,
inspired

perhaps in contrast to the hatred which the Shah
among

his

subjects,

grew

to

proportions

unknown

previously even in Shii Islam.67
Not only do the Shii ayatollahs hold the veneration and
admiration

of

Shiis,

institutionalized
government.

means

but
of

they

support,

also

benefit

independent

from

from

any

Ayatollahs receive a customary tax on the incomes

of their followers.

This tax, the khums, usually amounts to

5 percent of each follower's

income.68

Since each Shii

supposedly attached to one particular ayatollah,

is

it follows

that the clerics manage financial independence, to a certain
extent, from the government.

However, the state also finances

the religious establishment, in the hopes of keeping it loyal.
Khomeini

also

had

considerable

access

to

the

infrastructure of the religious and secular opposition from
his exile in Iraq and then France.

He used the mosques to

reach them and give them political direction.

He used the

leftist factions and educated youth to spread his teachings in
the universities

and among the elites.

He also used tape

recorders and even the BBC to broadcast his intentions to the
Iranian people.69
Ayatollah Khomeini's charisma played a crucial role in
bringing together the dissatisfied and polarized segments of
Iranian society.

His charisma and his inherent legitimacy as

a mujtahid, envoy of the hidden Imam, allowed him to mobilize
Iranians whose instincts might have led them to wait out the
crisis.
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Finally,

the popular conception of the messianic Imam

returning to his people to lead them into an era of pure Islam
had

galvanized many uneducated

Iranians.

Among the

anti-

American and anti-Shah slogans that the crowds chanted on the
famous

Ashura

march

(December

11,

Ayatollah Khomeini's saintliness.70
had become the Imam.

1978)

were

To many,

paeans

to

the ayatollah

This exemplifies the extent to which the

revolution was understood to be a return to the Islamic umma.
B. Egypt; Factionalized Sunni Militants and Discredited
Ulama
The majority of Egyptians are Sunni Muslims, the orthodox
branch of Islam to which 85 percent of the world's Muslims
belong.

The

philosophies,

Islamic

revivalist

on the whole,

movements

derive

their

from the appeal of puritanical

Islam as an answer to the material and spiritual crises of
contemporary Egypt.

The many movements agree that Egyptian

society has fallen into moral decay, that the state no longer
provides for Egyptians adequately, and that foreign pressures
on the culture and the economy of Egypt must be repelled.
order to restore stability,

In

a Muslim government dispensing

Sharia law must replace the secular government of Egypt.

It

is the duty of all Muslims to strive toward replacing the
secular government,

which is promoting this fitna,

with an

Islamic government that will bring back the Umma.

On all

these points,

the

diverse

Islamic

revivalist movements

in

Egypt manage to agree.
In many ways,

the Islamic revivalist movements

remain
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divided.

First,

in their approach to the society in which

they live, but also in the way they strive to bring about the
Umma, their attitudes toward establishment Sunni Islam and the
ulama

of

Egypt,

and

in their

attitudes

toward

their

own

leaders— in all these ways the many Islamic movements in Egypt
have interpreted the Quran and the Sunna differently.
Scholars have
groups

in Egypt.

counted 29 different
These

include

the

viability and disruptive potential.

Islamic revivalist

groups

which

possess

Egyptian authorities have

counted as many as ninety-nine, many of which are discovered
and contained or suppressed periodically by the government.71
The most important movements, mentioned earlier, remain
the

Muslim

Brotherhood

(Ikhwan

al-Muslimin), the

Islamic

Liberation Organization (Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Islami), the
Society of Muslims

(Jamaat al-Muslimin, also known as Takfir

wal-Hijra), and the

Holy War

Organization

(Munazzamat

al-

Jihad, also known as New Jihad).
The Muslim Brotherhood is the oldest, and most moderate,
of these organizations.
Banna,

It was founded in 1928 by Hasan al-

a teacher from Ismailiyya, with the twofold goal of

liberating the Islamic nation from foreign powers and creating
a free Islamic state in its place.72
Muslims,

and

the

original

goals

HWO

derived

their

The ILO, the Society of
philosophies

of the Muslim Brotherhood.

from

However,

the

their

membership and tactics reflect a higher level of militancy
drawn

from the writings

of

Sayyid

Qutb,

a

revivalist who

joined the Muslim Brotherhood after the death of Hasan al-
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Banna.73

Al-Banna

wanted

to

bring

Egypt

out

from

under

imperialist domination and away from the spell of westernism.
He warned against the appeal of secular nationalism, a western
concept,

arguing that a better conception of one's identity

lay within the Islamic Umma.74
The Muslim Brotherhood has retained the anti-western bent
of al-Banna's original
organization
emerged

as

of

its

the

ideology.

inception,

largest,

But from the underground
the Muslim Brotherhood has

best-known

Islamic revival movement in Egypt.

and

most

established

The mission of the Muslim

Brotherhood, like that of other revival movements in Egypt, is
to bring Islam back into the apparatus of the state in order
to

create

the

Umma.

But

unlike

most

of

the

other

organizations, the Muslim Brotherhood proposes to achieve the
transformation of the state through a jihad based on education
and political participation rather than on violent action.75
The Muslim Brotherhood survived the repression of the
movement

throughout

leadership

and

the

the

Nasser

members

and

spent

Sadat
many

years,
years

in

when

the

prison.

Originally militant, it emerged in the late 1970's and early
1980's

as

Moderation
treatment

a

more

moderate

voice

its

ideology

has

of
from

the

The

parliament.

even,

as

in

Muslim

revivalism.
more

lenient

Brotherhood

through which it continues its

propaganda against the secular state.
politics,

Islamic

resulted

government.

publishes its own magazines,

of

mentioned

It also participates in

earlier,

winning

seats

in
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The

particular

hostility

is

the

focus
secular

of

the

Muslim

nationalist

Brotherhood's

state,

which

the

Brotherhood's ideologues see as a western construct dividing
the universal

Islamic Umma.

Sayyid Qutb,

one of the most

militant ideologues of the Muslim Brotherhood, identified the
secular nationalist state as equivalent to the iahili state,
the

barbaric

jahili

states

servitude,

pre-Islamic
are

state

governed

"one man's

by

lordship

of Arabia.
political

He

noted

systems

over another,"

that

based

on

echoing the

earlier analysis of Egypt as a neo-patrimonial state.76
Sayyid Qutb's writings convey hostility toward the West,
and in general a militant attitude toward bringing the secular
state back to Islam.

His most lasting contribution to the

ideology of Islamic revival groups, the Muslim Brotherhood and
its more militant offshoots, lies in his interpretation of the
concept of jihad.

According to Qutb, the Islamic Umma will

not come about through mass movement but rather through the
hard work of an elite of dedicated Muslims.

The ultimate goal

of the elite is to establish "al Hakimmiyyah— the reign of
Allah's sovereignty on earth to end all sin,

suffering, and

repression.1,77
The literal interpretation of jihad as active struggle
and the concept of the elite of muslims, or vanguard, are the
focal

points

groups.

of disagreement

among the various

revivalist

Qutb did not provide guidelines to differentiate

between the elite and those who belonged to jahiliyya society.
Some

of

his

writings

can

be

interpreted

to

advocate

the
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separation of the true Muslims, those who form the vanguard of
Islamic

revivalism,

from jahiliyya

society,

following

the

example of the Prophet Muhammad and his flight to Medina (the
hijra).
But

Qutb

did

not

make

it

clear

whether

he

was

recommending physical or spiritual removal from society.

He

also did not explicitly condemn as impious Muslims those who
chose not to join revivalist groups,
the

necessity

of

separation

from

although he maintained

jahiliyya

society.

The

Muslim Brotherhood has chosen to interpret his call to jihad
in light of the Quranic verse (16:125),
Call unto the way of thy Lord with wisdom and fair
exhortation, and reason with them in the better way. Lo!
thy Lord is best aware of him who strayeth from His way
and He is Best Aware of those who go aright.78
The leaders of the Islamic Liberation Organization (ILO),
however, read Qutb literally.
regime,

They command jihad against the

in the form of a coup to bring Muslim leadership to

the government.

Egyptian society, according to the Islamic

Liberation Organization,

will be reformed from above.

The

prison experience, rather than cooling their fervor, rendered
them

more

overthrow

determined
the

than

government.79

ever

to

use

They were

violent
also

means

to

galvanized

by

Sayyid Qutb's example, his execution by the Egyptian state in
19 67 providing them with a model of martyrdom.80
ILO members also perceive the Muslim Brotherhood as too
complacent and the ulama as coopted by the government.

Since

it is the religious duty of the Muslim to see that a truly
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Islamic social order comes about, Muslims must make sure that
Sharia law is implemented as quickly as possible.
one may use any means,

including modern ones.81

To do so,

The ILO thus

infiltrated the military and other government institutions in
order to spring into action whenever an opportunity arose.
Its

leader,

Salih

Siriyya,

Members outvoted him.

advised

caution

and

patience.

This resulted in the attempted coup

against Anwar Sadat in 1974.82
The activist orientation of the ILO is markedly different
from that of the Society of Muslims.

The Society of Muslims,

though also veterans of a prison experience, and founded by a
former member of the Muslim Brotherhood,
whole of society is jahili, or barbaric.

believe that the

The change must not

come from the top, but rather from the bottom up.
of Muslims,
emulate

the

The elite

in order to bring about the Muslim state, must
life

of

the

Prophet

every

step

of

the

way.

Therefore, like Muhammad in the face of jahili Mecca, Muslims
must follow their leader, Shukri Mustafa,
jahili society.

and withdraw from

In their mini-society, they live according to

the laws of Islam, gaining strength until they can return to
deal the death knell to jahili society.83
The leader of the Society of Muslims,

Shukri Mustafa,

believed that everything that came after the Quran and the
accounts of the tradition of the Prophet (Surma) was tainted
by interpretation.

Therefore the four major schools of law in

Sunni Islam are invalid, which makes establishment Islam, and
ulama, illegitimate.

Mustafa also believed that the jurists
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who developed the

four schools of law did so to limit the

ability of Muslims to interpret the verses of the Quran for
themselves.

They

dared

to

come

between

God

and

his

worshippers, which placed them squarely outside the bounds of
Islam.

Therefore they were jahili.84

Moreover, the ulama did not obfuscate the Quran merely to
shore up their own power but also to issue fatwas to fit the
views of the sovereign.

He offered the example of Sheikh Suad

Jalal of the University of al-Azhar, who proclaimed that beer
did not fall under the prohibition of alcohol.85

Therefore,

not only were the ulama assisting illegitimate rulers,
they were spreading sin.

but

As a result, the Society of Muslims

is quite strongly opposed to establishment Islam.
Shukri

Mustafafs

violent

dislike

of

the

paralleled by his disdain for formal education.

ulama

was

Although he

had received a Bachelor's degree in Agriculture, Mustafa saw
the

public

useless,
Egyptians.

education

in

light

of

given
the

by

the

state

to

underemployment

Egyptians
of

as

educated

He said in court,

The teaching of writing for its own sake is illicit...
The Prophet did not open kuttab (Koranic schools) and
institutions to teach Muslims writing and arithmetic, but
permitted them to be taught according to needs and
necessities.86
Some members of the Society of Muslims regarded Shukri
Mustafa as the mahdi, or messiah.

His autocratic leadership

controlled every aspect of their lives, including marriage and
employment.87

He was feared and respected by members of the

Society of Muslims, who considered him an exemplary Muslim.
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Like Salih Siriyya, leader of the ILO, Shukri Mustafa was an
educated charismatic leader whose organization survived his
death.
The Islamic revival group which has had the most dramatic
impact on Egypt's politics is the Holy War Organization, also
known as al-Jihad.

Al-Jihad members assassinated Anwar Sadat

on the sixth of October 1981.

Their leadership, organization,

and tactics are quite different from the ILO's and the Society
of Muslims'.
The members of the Holy War Organization do not believe
that Egyptian society is jahili.

Rather, they see Egyptian

society as mostly Muslim, but held hostage by an impious, or
jahili, government.
of

Islamic

ideologue

Instead of rejecting the interpretations

law offered by the
of the

cell

of the

four schools
HWO

that

of

Islam,

assassinated

the

Sadat

founded his arguments on the Traditions.88
This ideologue, Abd al-Salam Faraj, was an electrician
who published a pamphlet describing The Hidden Imperative, a
reference to jihad, which he believed to be the sixth pillar
of Islam.

He argues in this pamphlet that ulama have obscured

the need for jihad through their calls for stability, in order
to maintain the leadership of the impious government in power.
In his

pamphlet,

Faraj

also explains

that other movements

seeking to establish the Umma have failed.

Therefore it is

time for the removal of the apostate leaders from the head of
the state.

His pamphlet is focused on the political analysis

of power and state rather than on society, which has been the
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focus of most of the other revival movements.89
In particular, Faraj focused on the scholar Ibn Taimiyya,
a

jurist

from

the

14th

century

whose

writings

include

a

condemnation of the Mongol rulers of Islamic lands for the
imposition

of

non-Islamic

Muslim population.90
the

political

contemporary

codes

Faraj

situation

Egypt.

He

of

law,

the

v asa. on the

found many similarities between
described

followed

by
Ibn

Ibn

Taimiyya

Taimiyya*s

and

lead

by

advocating jihad against the non-Muslim ruler.
The Holy War Organization also differs from the Society
of Muslims in its refusal to separate from society.
of

the

HWO

believe

instead

that

only

Members

through

mass

participation after the coup can the Muslim order come about.
They

reflect

this

belief

by

infiltrating

the

military,

security services, and other organs of government and also by
their

emphasis

on

consultative

leadership

rather

than

autocratic leadership.91
A ten-man consultative assembly leads the HWO, with a
supervisory

apparatus

overseeing

the

combat

wing,

the

operational support, and the propaganda of the organization.
The organization trains its own soldiers in martial arts and
conventional fighting.
black market.

They also acquire weapons

from the

Interestingly, the leaders of the HWO also rely

on the fatwas of a Sheikh, or learned man of Islam, to justify
their actions.92
Thus,

while

the

members

of

the

HWO

believe

in

the

imperative of jihad and the uselessness of ulama, they do not
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believe in the immorality of Egyptian society.
not

They also do

follow one leader in a messianic manner but belong to

different cells of an organization which consults its members
before acting.

Finally, they do not reject Muslim tradition

as a whole, but only the politics of contemporary Egypt.
All

four

Islamic

consider jihad

revival

a necessity,

movements

described

above

although they differ in their

interpretation of the means of jihad.

They also agree on the

uselessness of establishment Islam ulama, although attitudes
towards them range from the Muslim Brotherhood1s indifference
to the Society of Muslims*

outright hostility.

While the

Muslim Brotherhood and the Society of Muslims follow a more
autocratic

leadership,

which

could

be

reflected

in

their

models for an Islamic state, the Holy War Organization and the
Islamic

Liberation

Organization

are

governed

by

more

democratic consultative councils, which they would like to see
in a Muslim state.

Finally, the movements also disagree about

the extent of the immorality of the society in Egypt,

and

whether the solution should come from the bottom up or through
a coup d*etat,

or even through withdrawal from contemporary

society to a mini-society of utopian Muslims.

III. Regime Responses
In

Egypt,

throughout

the

presidencies

of

Sadat

and

Mubarak, the government has consistently responded to violence
from

Islamic

measures,

revival

while

groups

allowing

more

with

violently

moderate

groups

repressive
to

express

47
themselves.
movement

It

draws

mysticism,

and

is
on

repressing
decisions

an

that

economic problems

understood

in Islamic

the

Islamic

Egyptian

tradition

benefits

from

it

in Egypt.93

violence,

that

has

faith

and

present

socio

Mubarak*s government,

though

allowed

newspapers

the

of

revival

public

debate

and magazines

about

its

and through

participation in politics.
Nevertheless,

Mubarak maintains

control

over both the

state and the political participation of the citizens through
his hold on the bureaucracy, the cabinet, and the Parliament.
The failure of Nasserism and the discrediting of both Nasser
and Sadat in the eyes of the Egyptian people have led Mubarak
to keep a lower profile than his predecessors.
charismatic leader, but a head of state.

He is not a

As such, he does not

refer to the Egyptian people as his children,

as Sadat did.

He

fell

has

also avoided

the trap

that

the

Shah

into by

identifying his personal power with the power of the state of
Iran.
Mubarak has also responded to the pressure of the Islamic
revival movements to take a sterner attitude toward Israel and
forge

better

relations

with

the

Arab

world.94

This

has

earned him grudging acceptance by the moderate revivalists and
the secular Left as well.

Furthermore, Mubarak benefits from

the support of ulama, who feel as threatened by some of the
more radical revival movements as the state does.
Thus, although Mubarak's Egypt is experiencing a crisis,
the prevalent attitude toward the president is indifference
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rather than hostility.95

Most Egyptians may be struggling,

and the ideology of Islam proves appealing, but the avenues
for expression have not been closed.
careful
whose

about

denigrating

violent

receive

tactics

harsh

Islam.

repulse

treatment

in

Mubarak has been very

Only the radical
the

the

majority
media.

of

groups

Egyptians

Moreover,

the

government acknowledges that the economy is in crisis, and has
made some effort to remedy the problem.
and

limited

democracy

seems

to

Meanwhile, cautious

placate

all

but

the most

radical elements of society.96
The Pahlavi response to the growing dissatisfaction in
Iran differed from the moderate and careful response of the
Mubarak regime.

Any and all disagreement with the Iranian

regime was illegal and amounted to personal treason against
the Shah.
other

Any attempt to participate in politics through any

organ

treason.97

than

the

Rastakhiz

party was

also

considered

The Shah was the state and Iranians were expected

to honor him as such.
When the Shah

removed all

the traditional

anchors of

Iranian society through his systematic campaigns against the
Shii establishment, the bazaaris, and the nationalist parties,
Iranians

toppled

polarization

and

him
mass

in

order

to

topple

politicization

of

the

state.

Iranians

The

probably

would not have occurred to the same extent if the regime* s
responses had not emphasized its disregard for the people.98
The only independent way to oppose the regime, after the
Shah

had

tightened

his

control

over

the

bureaucracy,
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institutions,
clerics.
support

and

elites

They benefited
granted

them

of

Iran,

was

to

follow the

Shii

from the wide network of popular

through

the

khums

and

the

personal

allegiance to ayatollahs that most traditional Iranians still
practiced.

They presented the people of Iran with a simple

oppositional message that was vague enough in content to have
cross-ethnic and cross-generational

appeal.

Finally,

they

provided a charismatic leader whose legitimacy was untainted
by involvement in government,

and who could use the Shah's

tactics against the opposition to cast him as Yazid, the evil
tyrant of Shii history.

Whv the Islamic Revolution Was Confined to Iran

The political circumstances articulated above show that
Pahlavi

Iran

and

contemporary

Egypt,

though

both

neo-

patrimonial states undergoing an Islamic revival, differ on
other basic points.

The Shah's blatant consolidation of power

and personal wealth,

as demonstrated in his celebration at

Persepolis and the creation of the Rastakhiz party,

are in

marked contrast to Mubarak's low profile leadership and use of
limited democracy.

But the two states differ in other ways

too.
The Shii population of Iran and the Sunni population of
Egypt do not hold the same religious beliefs.

While Shiism

and Sunnism fall under the umbrella of Islam, the Shiis hold
particular

beliefs

in

the

messianic

Imam

and

in

the
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infallibility
hold.

of their

ayatollahs which the Sunnis do not

This makes it difficult for the various Islamic revival

movements to agree on a common leader and a common strategy.
Shiis, through their history, also hold the belief that
they

are the

followers

of Ali

and his children,

who were

martyrized by the political establishment of Yazid.

Sunnis,

on

one

the

other

political

hand,

understand

dominance.

They

their

feel

history

very

little

affinity for martyrdom or political protest.
willing

to maintain

western mode

of

themselves

life

separate

that they

perceive

as

of

historical

While they are

from the

secular,

as corrupt,

most

practicing Sunnis shy away from active struggle in the form of
j ihad.
The ulama are religious learned men who help interpret
the Quran, not sources of challenge to the authorities, unless
the authorities are foreign,
colonial occupiers in Egypt.

as in the case of the British
Their income,

in the case of

Egypt, comes from the Ministry of Waqfs, or religious affairs.
This restricts their freedom to disagree too vocally with the
government.

However, by virtue of being the guardians of the

oldest university in the Muslim world

(al-Azhar) , they hold

the respect of most traditional Egyptians.
Finally,

the opposition to the Shah was unified by its

common goal and its common reaction to the Shah's autocratic
rule.

In Egypt,

the opposition

is still very fragmented,

whether within or without the Islamic revival movement.

The

more

the

radical

Islamic

movements

seek

to

overthrow

government

or withdraw

from

society completely,

while the

secular parties and the Muslim Brotherhood seek to challenge
the government through electoral politics.

There still does

not exist in Egypt the consensus about the urgency of the
removal of the leader that existed in Iran.

Revival movements

in Egypt are just as likely to excommunicate each other's
members and revile each other's leaders as they are to oppose
the government.
Thus,

while

Mubarak

faces

a

crisis

in the

continued

deterioration of the economy and the growing dissatisfaction
of members of the underprivileged segments of society, he is
not facing a revolution yet."

In order to diffuse the more

violent Islamic revival groups, Mubarak may have to implement
some changes in the secular constitution of Egypt and in his
relations with the West.
may

inhibit

the

However, his dependence on U.S. aid

reforms

necessary

to

popularity of Islamic revival movements.
Islamic

revival

movements

are

not

yet

stop

the

growing

Nevertheless, the
the

causes

of

an

imminent revolution, but merely the symptoms of a spiritual
and socio-economic crisis.
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